Collective Dominance and Collusion
Show Less

Collective Dominance and Collusion

Parallelism in EU and US Competition Law

Marilena Filippelli

By examining the issue of collusion in EU and US competition law, this book suggests possible strategies for improving the antitrust enforcement against parallelism, by exploiting the most advanced achievements of economic analysis.
Buy Book in Print
Show Summary Details
You do not have access to this content

Chapter 7: Abuses of collective dominance

Parallelism in EU and US Competition Law

Marilena Filippelli


In EU case law, the notion of dominance describes the firms’ ability to behave independently of rivals, consumers, and customers – that is, to implement whatever market strategy they want, in the awareness that no countervailing power may jeopardize it. In the case of joint market power, independent behaviour refers to any undertakings ‘so linked as to their conduct on a particular market that they present themselves on that market as a collective entity vis-à-vis their competitors, their trading partners and consumers’. The ability of several independent companies to act together as if they were a single entity and to jointly exert market power is the essence of collective dominance. Although there is no more doubt that the concept of dominance covers both single and collective dominant positions, the antitrust approach to collective dominance still faces significant difficulties. Firstly, the method developed under art. 102 for the case of single dominance cannot apply as such to collective dominance. In fact, the involvement of many companies softens the significance of high market shares for the inference of dominance; also, the absence of any structural presumption for collective dominance in EU competition law highlights the need for combining structural and non-structural factors for this assessment. Moreover, the presence itself of several firms sharing market power makes collective dominance different from single dominance: for individual decisions to result in a single market strategy, there must be something that polarizes single actions towards a common point. For this reason, in the analysis of collective dominance

You are not authenticated to view the full text of this chapter or article.

Elgaronline requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books or journals. Please login through your library system or with your personal username and password on the homepage.

Non-subscribers can freely search the site, view abstracts/ extracts and download selected front matter and introductory chapters for personal use.

Your library may not have purchased all subject areas. If you are authenticated and think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

Further information

or login to access all content.