Corruption, Grabbing and Development
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Corruption, Grabbing and Development

Real World Challenges

Edited by Tina Søreide and Aled Williams

All societies develop their own norms about what is fair behaviour and what is not. Violations of these norms, including acts of corruption, can collectively be described as forms of ‘grabbing’. This unique volume addresses how grabbing hinders development at the sector level and in state administration. The contributors – researchers and practitioners who work on the ground in developing countries – present empirical data on the mechanisms at play and describe different types of unethical practices.
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Chapter 5: Courts, corruption and judicial independence

Siri Gloppen

Extract

A well-functioning justice system is crucial to address corruption effectively, which in turn is important for development. But judicial institutions are themselves corruptible. Surveys show that experiences with and perceptions of corruption in the courts are widespread (Afrobarometer, 2010; Latinobarometer, 2010; Eurobarometer, 2011; TI, 2011; GCR, 2012: 303; World Justice Project, 2012). In its 2011 Annual Report, Transparency International (TI) noted that, globally, almost half of those surveyed (46 per cent) perceived their judiciary as corrupt. According to the Eurobarometer (2012), around a third of Europeans think corruption is widespread in their judicial services (32 per cent). In Bangladesh, 88 per cent reported having experienced corruption when dealing with the courts (TI, 2012: 23), 85 per cent of Peruvians had little or no confidence in their judiciary (Latinobarometer, 2010), and in countries as diverse as Afghanistan, Bolivia, Bulgaria, Cambodia, Croatia, Ethiopia, Georgia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Moldova, Morocco, Peru and Ukraine, the judiciary was seen as the most corrupt of all public institutions (TI, 2012: 19). Corruption and perceptions of corruption in the judiciary not only undermines the courtsí credibility as corruption fighters. More generally, it erodes trust in the courtsí impartiality, harming all the core judicial functions, such as dispute resolution, law enforcement, protection of property rights and contract enforcement. In addition, it harms the broader accountability function that the judiciary is entrusted with in democratic systems ñ upholding citizensí rights, securing the integrity of the political rules of the game, and sanctioning representatives of other branches when they act in contravention of the law.

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