Edited by Roger D. Congleton and Arye L. Hillman
In this chapter, we review our knowledge as to how different ways of sharing a prize among the members of a group in collective rent seeking affect individuals’ incentives to contribute to their group’s aggregate effort. Starting with Nitzan in 1991, the literature has considered both exogenous and endogenous sharing rules, while it has assumed that the choice of such rules may occur under either public or private information. In turn, group sharing rules affect the extent of total rent dissipation, the occurrence of the group size paradox, group formation and the choice between productive and appropriative activities.
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