Edited by Roger D. Congleton and Arye L. Hillman
Chapter 9: Sabotage in contests
This chapter reviews the literature on sabotage in contests. In such cases, contenders expend resources in contests to hinder or impede the efforts of other contenders. Resources used in sabotage are wastefully used and add to the resources used unproductively by rent seekers to win a rent. The theory of sabotage in contests is more general than rent seeking and includes any contest in which the opportunity is available to impede competitors. A basic feature of sabotage is that if there are more than two contenders in a contest, resources used by any one contender to sabotage any other contender have attributes of public-good benefits for other contenders. The review in this chapter encompasses the formal game-theoretic, empirical and experimental literature. The formal model is in the chapter Appendix.
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