Edited by Roger D. Congleton and Arye L. Hillman
Chapter 26: Rent seeking and constitutional political economy
Rent seeking and constitutional political economy are based on different foundations. Constitutional political economy models politics as exchange, and depicts government action as a cooperative endeavor in which people work together to collectively achieve goals that they would be unable to accomplish with bilateral exchange. In contrast, rent seeking depicts a political system in which some people are able to use the force of government to provide benefits for themselves at the expense of others. One is the calculus of consent; the other is the calculus of coercion.
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