Understanding the Global Regulatory Process
Edited by Francesca Bignami and David Zaring
Chapter 8: The campaign enforcement style: Chinese practice in context and comparison
Over the last three decades in China a particular form of regulatory enforcement has developed. It is best understood as a pattern of long periods of weak and lax enforcement, followed by short periods of strong and coercive enforcement. The weak periods are characterized by limited inspections, weak sanctions, and the strong influence of regulated firms. During the strong periods, enforcement is intense and coercive, entailing numerous inspections, tough sanctions, an important role for central authorities in monitoring local enforcement agents, and less influence for regulated firms. This alternating pattern of regulatory enforcement can be called a “campaign” enforcement style. The “campaign” enforcement style has some particularly Chinese characteristics. It is politically controlled, pursues salient targets, sometimes after a scandal involving those targets, and fits well with an authoritarian, but increasingly fragmented and experimental, system of government. In other ways it parallels Western law enforcement, which has employed its own brand of enforcement campaigns. This chapter provides an analysis of China’s enforcement campaigns. It seeks to understand what they are and what effects they have had. Moreover, it seeks to place them in a comparative perspective, both temporally, with respect to China’s Maoist campaigns, and geographically, with respect to politically induced law enforcement in Western contexts. The chapter argues that their continued use can be explained at least in part by China’s particular legal legacy and the political environment of authoritarianism. Campaigns, however, are not uniquely Chinese. Campaign-style enforcement also exists in the West.
You are not authenticated to view the full text of this chapter or article.
Elgaronline requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books or journals. Please login through your library system or with your personal username and password on the homepage.
Non-subscribers can freely search the site, view abstracts/ extracts and download selected front matter and introductory chapters for personal use.
Your library may not have purchased all subject areas. If you are authenticated and think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.