Edited by Marta Sinclair
Chapter 8: Self-report assessment of individual differences in preferences for analytic and intuitive processing: a critical review
Despite their inherent limitations, self-report procedures have been the mainstay of intuition research in laboratory and field settings and have contributed much to the understanding of the nature and role of individual differences pertaining to preferences for analytical and intuitive approaches to information processing in basic and applied domains (Hodgkinson & Sadler-Smith, 2011; Hodgkinson et al., 2008, 2009a). Over the course of several decades there has been a proliferation of self-report instruments for the assessment of these differences, referred to variously as ‘cognitive styles’, ‘thinking styles’ and ‘cognitive strategies’ (see, e.g., Armstrong et al., 2012; Coffield et al., 2004; Hayes & Allinson, 1994; Hayes et al., 2003; Hodgkinson & Sadler-Smith, 2003a, 2003b; Hodgkinson et al., 2009b; Sternberg, 1997). The purpose of this chapter is to offer a selective critical overview of what has undoubtedly become a contested and potentially confusing terrain for academic researchers and practitioners alike. Motivated by the growing body of work supporting dual-process conceptions of human cognition (e.g., Evans, 2008; Lieberman, 2007; Stanovich & West, 2000), four selected instruments designed to assess individual differences in preferences for intuitive and analytic processing form the focus of our review, namely: the Cognitive Style Index (Allinson & Hayes, 1996); Preference for Intuition and Deliberation scale (Betsch, 2004); Rational Experiential Inventory (Epstein et al., 1996); and the Linear Non-Linear Thinking Styles Profile (Vance et al., 2007).
You are not authenticated to view the full text of this chapter or article.