Research Handbook on Shareholder Power
Show Less

Research Handbook on Shareholder Power

Edited by Jennifer G. Hill and Randall S. Thomas

Much of the history of corporate law has concerned itself not with shareholder power, but rather with its absence. Yet, as this Handbook shows, there have been major shifts in capital market structure that require a reassessment of the role and power of shareholders. This book provides a contemporary analysis of shareholder power and considers the regulatory consequences of changing ownership patterns around the world. Leading international scholars in corporate law, governance and financial economics address these central issues from a range of different perspectives including historical, contemporary, legal, economic, political and comparative.
Buy Book in Print
Show Summary Details
You do not have access to this content

Chapter 25: The future of Japanese corporate governance: Japan’s internal governance and development of Japanese-style external governance through engagement

Takaaki Eguchi and Zenichi Shishido


Many Western observers, especially investors, have expressed uneasiness about the way Japanese public companies are governed. For these observers, shareholders are the company’s owners. Japanese public companies are heretical because they do not appear to be run for the interests of their shareholders, but rather for the interests of their managers and employees. The chronically low level of returns on equity in Japanese companies is taken as evidence for the scant concern that management has for shareholders’ interests. Consequently, Western observers call for reform. However, there is a puzzle to solve before we hastily take any definitive action. We need to first ask ourselves why Japanese public companies are run differently from the Western standard. Since many Japanese public companies have existed for half a century, or even longer, and have been successful, it is not rational to assume that they have been wrong since their inception. Considering their success, there must be some valid reasons why Japanese public companies are governed the way they are. Indeed, until the mid-1980s—just before the period of the asset-inflation bubble—Japanese corporate governance seems to have worked well. What went wrong after that? Will we need a complete revamping of the system? Where is Japanese corporate governance headed? Can we keep the essential elements of Japanese corporate governance while fixing other parts to strengthen it? These are the questions that are the focus of this chapter.

You are not authenticated to view the full text of this chapter or article.

Elgaronline requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books or journals. Please login through your library system or with your personal username and password on the homepage.

Non-subscribers can freely search the site, view abstracts/ extracts and download selected front matter and introductory chapters for personal use.

Your library may not have purchased all subject areas. If you are authenticated and think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

Further information

or login to access all content.