Research Handbook on Shareholder Power
Show Less

Research Handbook on Shareholder Power

Edited by Jennifer G. Hill and Randall S. Thomas

Much of the history of corporate law has concerned itself not with shareholder power, but rather with its absence. Yet, as this Handbook shows, there have been major shifts in capital market structure that require a reassessment of the role and power of shareholders. This book provides a contemporary analysis of shareholder power and considers the regulatory consequences of changing ownership patterns around the world. Leading international scholars in corporate law, governance and financial economics address these central issues from a range of different perspectives including historical, contemporary, legal, economic, political and comparative.
Buy Book in Print
Show Summary Details
You do not have access to this content

Chapter 27: Shareholder power in India

George S. Geis


A casual observer of the Indian economy might be excused for believing that shareholder power is on the rise in the subcontinent. As the story goes, Indian firms are starting to feel the effect of forces that have buffeted corporate managers in the West: the rising influence of institutional investors, proxy advisors, hedge funds, and activist shareholders. Moreover, recent corporate governance reforms in India are closely patterned on regulatory initiatives from countries where shareholders have loud voices. The push for reforms like greater information disclosure and director accountability implicitly relies on a meaningful body of outside shareholders to monitor the news and guard against managerial agency costs. But a careful look at the underlying composition of equity ownership in India suggests that the exact opposite is true: India can best be understood as a stable counter-example to the alleged global trend towards shareholder activism. Indeed, most of the evidence suggests that outside shareholder power remains, for all practical purposes, largely irrelevant for major Indian firms. The ownership structure of India’s largest public corporations continues to be skewed toward controlling inside shareholders – a legacy of family-owned business ventures and state nationalization.

You are not authenticated to view the full text of this chapter or article.

Elgaronline requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books or journals. Please login through your library system or with your personal username and password on the homepage.

Non-subscribers can freely search the site, view abstracts/ extracts and download selected front matter and introductory chapters for personal use.

Your library may not have purchased all subject areas. If you are authenticated and think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

Further information

or login to access all content.