The Economic Characteristics of Developing Jurisdictions
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The Economic Characteristics of Developing Jurisdictions

Their Implications for Competition Law

Edited by Michal S. Gal, Mor Bakhoum, Josef Drexl, Eleanor M. Fox and David J. Gerber

There is ongoing debate as to what competition law and policy is most suitable for developing jurisdictions. This book argues that the unique characteristics of developing jurisdictions matter when crafting and enforcing competition law and these should be placed at the heart of analysis when considering which competition laws are judicious. Through examining different factors that influence the adoption and implementation of competition laws in developing countries, this book illustrates the goals of such laws, the content of the legal rules, and the necessary institutional, political, ideological and legal conditions that must complement such rules. The book integrates development economics with competition law to provide an alternative vision of competition law, concluding that ‘one competition law and policy size’ does not fit ‘all socio-economic contexts'.
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Chapter 8: Bid rigging and its interface with corruption

David Lewis


While bid rigging is by no means the only interface between anti-competitive conduct and corrupt conduct, it is, as befits per se prohibited anti-competitive conduct, arguably the most unequivocal and costly interface. When I use the term ‘bid rigging’ I refer to a private horizontal agreement between competitors designed to determine the outcome of a putatively atomised, individualised bidding process. The agreement may cover price, market and/or customer allocation and the identity of the winner of the bid, and frequently also the payback to the losers. This is bid rigging in its normal antitrust meaning and which most competition statutes prohibit per se along with other price and market allocation agreements. Notionally competing suppliers are not competing on the merits, they are not offering the lowest priced, best quality goods and services that they are capable of supplying. They are rather putting in an offer that is the product of a clandestine agreement amongst themselves, an agreement that by its very nature will include not only the agreed, supra-competitive winning price but also the identity of the winner and, naturally, of the losers. I distinguish this from ‘bid corruption’ which is the solicitation by, or offer to, a public official of something of value in order to influence the outcome of a bid.

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