Chapter 4: Constitutional interpretation
AbstractEven if the case against the desirability of strong judicial review were conclusive, a realistic constitutional theory would have to face the fact that the authority to specify abstract human rights provisions has been, in most countries, already conferred on the judiciary. Those who are sceptical about the legitimacy of judicial review must therefore also offer a non-ideal, or second-best, theory as to how courts already authorized to apply human rights provisions should interpret those provisions. That is the primary reason why the book dedicates a separate chapter to constitutional interpretation. The general thrust of Chapter Four is that judges should usually defer to the views of the legislature in interpreting the constitution.
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