Resale Price Maintenance and Vertical Territorial Restrictions Theory and Practice in EU Competition Law and US Antitrust Law
Theory and Practice in EU Competition Law and US Antitrust Law
- New Horizons in Competition Law and Economics series
Chapter 5: Theories and impacts of RPM and VTR on competition
AbstractThis chapter surveys procompetitive and anticompetitive theories and reasons behind introducing resale price maintenance and/or vertical territorial restraints. It involves explanations and arguments which go beyond the traditional economic view assisting with answering questions such as why RPM or VTR is introduced in situations where procompetitive theories would not make economic sense or did not apply in practice. It provides different points of view with respect to some ‘procompetitive’ explanations, showing that some of these explanations could have rather anticompetitive effects and/or could be seen as competitively neutral and that suppliers do not always have procompetitive reasons for introducing resale price maintenance or vertical territorial restraints but can have anticompetitive reasons and/or reasons which do not necessarily lead to procompetitive effects.
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