Edited by Claire A. Hill and Steven Davidoff Solomon
Chapter 15: Lead plaintiffs and lead counsel in deal litigation
AbstractThe widely shared perception is that class action plaintiffs’ lawyers claim undeserved credit for positive outcomes in deal litigation, and that lead plaintiffs are irrelevant figureheads who exercise no influence over litigation outcomes. This view persists despite substantial efforts made by Delaware courts to sort for high-quality lead plaintiffs and lead counsel, and by institutional investors to screen for law-firm quality in opting for portfolio monitoring services. Do these judicial and investor efforts to screen for class-action leadership quality matter? Recent empirical scholarship suggests that they do. Top law firms and public pension fund lead plaintiffs correlate with better outcomes for investors, greater attorney effort, and lower attorney fees. In the most conflict-ridden transactions, markets react positively to the filing of suits by top firms, and negatively to suits filed by poor-quality firms alone. This evidence suggests that the deep skepticism towards lead counsel and lead plaintiff selection criteria may be misplaced.
You are not authenticated to view the full text of this chapter or article.
Elgaronline requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books or journals. Please login through your library system or with your personal username and password on the homepage.
Non-subscribers can freely search the site, view abstracts/ extracts and download selected front matter and introductory chapters for personal use.
Your library may not have purchased all subject areas. If you are authenticated and think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.