Edited by Christine A. Mallin
Chapter 3: Remuneration-based incentives in a global bank before and after Lehman: the case of Deutsche Bank
AbstractThis chapter analyses performance-based incentives for members of the management board (executive directors) and of the supervisory board (non-executive directors) at Deutsche Bank from 2007 – that is, before the outbreak of the financial crisis in 2008 – to 2014. For the performance-based remuneration of management board members the study finds that Deutsche Bank already had a system in place in 2007 that supported long-term orientation because the performance measurement horizon and payment horizon were structured in such a way that the award year 2007 actually affected the time span from 2006 to 2011. This feature of the remuneration system has been developed further since then. Moreover, in 2013 Deutsche Bank introduced supplementary non-financial indicators to measure bank performance. Supervisory board remuneration increased markedly during the period of analysis, reflecting the growing importance and workload of supervisory board members. Following the international trend, performance-based remuneration for supervisory board members was discontinued in 2013.
You are not authenticated to view the full text of this chapter or article.
Elgaronline requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books or journals. Please login through your library system or with your personal username and password on the homepage.
Non-subscribers can freely search the site, view abstracts/ extracts and download selected front matter and introductory chapters for personal use.
Your library may not have purchased all subject areas. If you are authenticated and think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.