Greed, Corruption, and the Modern State
Show Less

Greed, Corruption, and the Modern State

Essays in Political Economy

Edited by Susan Rose-Ackerman and Paul Lagunes

What makes the control of corruption so difficult and contested? Drawing on the insights of political science, economics and law, the expert contributors to this book offer diverse perspectives. One group of chapters explores the nature of corruption in democracies and autocracies, and “reforms” that are mere facades. Other contributions examine corruption in infrastructure, tax collection, cross-border trade, and military procurement. Case studies from various regions – such as China, Peru, South Africa and New York City – anchor the analysis with real-world situations. The book pays particular attention to corruption involving international business and the domestic regulation of foreign bribery.
Buy Book in Print
Show Summary Details

Chapter 12: Regulation of foreign bribery: the FCPA enforcement model

Kevin E. Davis

Extract

The first phase in the global campaign to regulate foreign bribery is nearly complete. There is now a broad international consensus in favor of prohibiting bribery of foreign public officials, as evidenced by the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions and the United Nations Convention against Corruption. The next phase of the campaign requires analysts to step back to analyze the impact of these prohibitions with a view to determining whether additional interventions are required (see for example, Hines 1995; Cuervo-Cazurra 2008). It seems intuitive that the effects of prohibitions on foreign bribery depend on the strategies used to enforce them, that is, the cases pursued and the sanctions imposed. Those strategies are undoubtedly determined to some extent by the amount of resources devoted to enforcement as well as, of course, the strategies that firms adopt in response. What is less well understood, especially outside of legal circles, is that basic features of the underlying legal system also influence enforcement strategies in subtle yet important ways. This chapter examines how distinctive features of the US legal system have shaped the overall approach to enforcement of the prohibition on foreign bribery found in the United States’ Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 (FCPA).

You are not authenticated to view the full text of this chapter or article.

Elgaronline requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books or journals. Please login through your library system or with your personal username and password on the homepage.

Non-subscribers can freely search the site, view abstracts/ extracts and download selected front matter and introductory chapters for personal use.

Your library may not have purchased all subject areas. If you are authenticated and think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.


Further information

or login to access all content.