The Relational Corporate Governance Approach
Chapter 7: Empirical studies Key Field No 4 (Part 1): National shareholder protection regime and Board factors I
In this chapter, the relational approach begins the process of examining the governance variables taken from the governance codes in Chapter 6. Chapter 7 reviews in detail law, economic and econometric literature from the US, UK, Europe and Australia that comprises empirical studies outlined in Key Field No 4. In Chapter 2, the relational approach introduced the perceived general effects said to flow from the adoption of governance variables in the for-profit sphere. This was not challenged at that time. Beginning in this Chapter 7, Key Field No 4 examines the firm-specific benefits or, on the contrary, costs or disadvantages argued to flow from these variables. This will be done by reference to empirical studies of the effectiveness of governance variables in reducing agency costs and enhancing the long-term survival of the firm. Such efficiency and survival – an over-arching purpose of the relational approach – is assessed in these studies principally by measures of firm operating performance/profit and firm value. Other firm-specific outcomes such as ‘shareholder payout’, the cost of equity capital and the probability of earnings manipulation are also examined. There are three types of empirical studies examined in this chapter. First, Chapter 7 examines questions relating to whether a particular group of governance variables together improve firm operating performance, firm value and shareholder payout. The studies suggest that these measures may be improved by groupings of governance variables.
You are not authenticated to view the full text of this chapter or article.