The Evolutionary Perspective
Chapter 3: Evolution, metaethics and the natural law
Chapter 3 deals with the implications of the evolutionary view of human nature for the controversy between ius-naturalists and legal positivists. The argument I propose proceeds in two steps. In the first step I argue that the deep divergence between evolutionary ethics and genuine ethics may be plausibly interpreted as an argument for metaethical realism, that is, for the thesis that ethical (deontic and axiological) judgments possess truth values. In the second step I argue that even though metaethical realism is not contradictory to legal positivism, it better harmonizes with ius-naturalism than with legal positivism.
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