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Accession to the World Trade Organization

A Legal Analysis

Dylan Geraets

This detailed and perceptive book examines the extent and scope of how rules for accession to the WTO may vary between countries, approaching the concerns that some countries enter with a better deal than others. Dylan Geraets critiques these additional ‘rules’ and aims to answer the question of whether new Members of the WTO are under stricter rules than the original Members, whilst analysing the accession process to the multilateral trading system.
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Selected bibliography

A Legal Analysis

Dylan Geraets


Aaronson, Susan Ariel and Abouharb, M. Rodwan (2011), ‘Unexpected Bedfellows: The GATT, the WTO and Some Democratic Rights’, International Studies Quarterly (55) (2), pp. 379–408.

Aaronson, Susan Ariel and Abouharb, M. Rodwan (2013), ‘Does the WTO Help Member States Improve Governance?’, World Trade Review (13) (3), pp. 547–82.

Ala’i, Padideh and D’Orsi, Matthew (2011), Transparency in International Economic Relations and the Role of the WTO, in Ala’i, Padideh and Vaughn, Robert G. (eds) (2011), Research Handbook on Transparency, Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA, USA, Edward Elgar, pp. 368–99.

Allee, Todd L. and Scalera, Jamie E. (2012), ‘The Divergent Effects of Joining International Organizations: Trade Gains and the Rigors of WTO Accession’, International Organization (66) (2), pp. 243–76.

Andersen, Scott and Lau, Christian (2002), ‘Hedging Hopes with Fears in China’s Accession to the World Trade Organization: The Transitional Special-Product Safeguard for Chinese Exports’, The Journal of World Intellectual Property (5) (3), pp. 405–76.

Anderson, Kym (2014), ‘Contributions of the GATT/WTO to Global Economic Welfare: Empirical Evidence’, Journal of Economic Surveys (30) (1), pp. 56–92.

Au, Thomas H. (2013), ‘Reconciling WTO General Exceptions with China’s Accession Protocol’, Tsinghua China Law Review (5) (2), pp. 95–125.

Bagwell, Kyle and Staiger, Robert W. (1999), ‘An Economic Theory of GATT’, The American Economic Review (89) (1), pp. 215–48.

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