Handbook of Game Theory and Industrial Organization, Volume II
Show Less

Handbook of Game Theory and Industrial Organization, Volume II

Applications

Edited by Luis C. Corchón and Marco A. Marini

This second volume of the Handbook includes original contribution by experts in the field. It provides up-to-date surveys of the most relevant applications of game theory to industrial organization. The book covers both classical as well as new IO topics such as mergers in markets with homogeneous and differentiated goods, leniency and coordinated effects in cartels and mergers, static and dynamic contests, consumer search and product safety, strategic delegation, platforms and network effects, auctions, environmental and resource economics, intellectual property, healthcare, corruption, experimental industrial organization and empirical models of R & D.
Buy Book in Print
Show Summary Details
You do not have access to this content

Chapter 12: Auctions

Applications

Ángel Hernando-Veciana

Extract

Auction theory is a field of economics that has been developed during the last 50 years starting from Vickrey’s (1961) seminal paper. Its evolution has been one of the most successful applications of game theory with remarkable episodes like the spectrum auctions in the 1990s; see Cramton (1995) and Binmore and Klemperer (2002). Nowadays, auction theory is a well-established branch of economics for which there exist influential handbooks covering the basic tools and applications, e.g. Krishna (2002),Milgrom (2004), Klemperer (2004) and Menezes and Monteiro (2008). In this survey, I am going to provide a revision of advances in the field that have taken place around the last decade. To do so, I will structure this survey as follows. It starts with an introductory section in which I summarize the basic tools that I refer to in the subsequent sections. Next, I emphasize the advances in three innovative areas: position auctions, Internet auctions and combinatorial auctions. I finish with a section summarizing some remarkable contributions to auction theory throughout the decade organized by topics.

You are not authenticated to view the full text of this chapter or article.

Elgaronline requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books or journals. Please login through your library system or with your personal username and password on the homepage.

Non-subscribers can freely search the site, view abstracts/ extracts and download selected front matter and introductory chapters for personal use.

Your library may not have purchased all subject areas. If you are authenticated and think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.


Further information

or login to access all content.