An Introduction to Institutional Cryptoeconomics
This chapter considers blockchains as constitutional orders. Blockchains compete and complement with firms, markets, governments, clubs, and the commons. Additionally, their versatility (the constitution can be varied for each application) allow them to adopt the characteristics of other institutions. The authors call this the ‘universal Turing institution’. The chapter then explores the dynamics of institutional and constitutional innovation in distributed ledgers.
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