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The Political Economy of Non-Territorial Exit

Cryptosecession

Trent J. MacDonald

Territorial political organisation forms the backbone of western liberal democracies. However, political economists are increasingly aware of how this form of government neglects the preferences of citizens, resulting in dramatic conflicts. The Political Economy of Non-Territorial Exit explores the theoretical possibility of ‘unbundling’ government functions and decentralising territorial governance.
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List of figures

Trent J. MacDonald

3.1 Relationships between citizens, mobile property, territorial property and states
3.2 Cattle farmer bargains to raise more cattle and control more plots of land (without transaction costs)
3.3 Latent state bargains to enact policy and control its own citizenry (without secession costs)
3.4 Latent state unable to bargain for policy authority and control of its own citizenry (with secession costs)
3.5 No latent state and no need for bargaining (without secession costs)
4.1 Pairwise political-jurisdictional possibility frontier curve
4.2 Three-dimensional political-jurisdictional possibility frontier curves
4.3 Three-dimensional political-jurisdictional possibility frontier surface
4.4 Political-jurisdictional possibility frontier curves for three polity-economies
4.5 Graphical illustration of political-jurisdictional possibility frontier surfaces for three polity-economies
4.6 Transition between political-jurisdictional possibility frontier curves
4.7 Transition between political-jurisdictional possibility frontier surfaces
4.8 Economic possibility frontier and political-jurisdictional transformation frontier
4.9 PJTF (a), pairwise PJPF curve (b), and PJPF surface (c) illustrating an incomplete, suboptimal transformation
4.10 PJTF (a), pairwise PJPF curve (b), and PJPF surface (c) illustrating an optimised transformation (political-jurisdictional innovation)
4.11 PJTF (a), pairwise PJPF curve (b), and PJPF surface (c) illustrating an incomplete, suboptimal transformation (shift in PJPF)
4.12 PJTF (a), pairwise PJPF curve (b), and PJPF surface (c) illustrating an optimised transformation (shift in PJPF and political-jurisdictional innovation)
5.1 Secession-proof and cryptosecession-proof tax rates
5.2 Extensive-form representation of the cryptosecession game
5.3 Backward induction solution of the cryptosecession game
6.1 Spectrum of jurisdictional orders