Chapter 4: Government by relationships: policy, collegial oligarchies of insiders, and institutions of the political economy
Restricted access

Understanding activation of a stratigraphic combination of bureaucracy and collegiality can be useful to approach the functioning of production markets and issues of policy design and implementation in the political economy. Empirical network studies illustrate, for example, how top-down collegiality and coopetitive collegial oligarchies operate in the construction of markets in various industries (wine, biotech, restaurant, audiovisual, financial, etc.), and in the construction of transnational public institutions, here a transnational collegial oligarchy of committed European judges building, over decades, the European Unified Patent Court, and thus a new European intellectual property regime. The more the political economy depends on such private/public, exclusive, collegial pockets of institutional entrepreneurs operating at several levels simultaneously (vertical linchpins) and aligning heterogeneous cultural conventions and structures, the more stratigraphic activation and its multilevel relational infrastructures are able to manage problems of market and regulatory coopetition. This exposes the multilevel dimension of institutional capture.

You are not authenticated to view the full text of this chapter or article.

Access options

Get access to the full article by using one of the access options below.

Other access options

Redeem Token

Institutional Login

Log in with Open Athens, Shibboleth, or your institutional credentials

Login via Institutional Access

Personal login

Log in with your Elgar Online account

Login with you Elgar account