Market Dominance and Antitrust Policy, Second Edition
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Market Dominance and Antitrust Policy, Second Edition

Michael A. Utton

This new edition addresses the recent fundamental changes in antitrust law, especially in the UK and the EU, and reviews some high profile and controversial cases such as the Boeing–McDonnell Douglas merger and the Microsoft monopoly. The author moves on to deal with several unresolved questions including the conflicts between trade and antitrust policy, the foreign take-over of domestic assets and extra-territorial claims made by certain countries.
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Chapter 5: Market Conduct of Dominant Firms I

Michael A. Utton

Extract

Utton2 02 chap 5 4/12/02 16:20 Page 85 5 Market conduct of dominant firms: I I Introduction Established firms seldom produce a single product at a uniform price for one market. The more usual case is supply of a range of products (or services) to a number of markets which may be separated geographically, physically or in time. In some markets, the firm may have considerable market power, in others practically none at all. Some markets may contain heavily differentiated products, while others may consist of well defined or graded homogeneous goods. Conditions on the buyer’s side of the market may also vary considerably. The same supplying firm may thus be confronted in some of its markets by two or three powerful customers, some of whom may be government agencies, while in others it may be selling to hundreds or thousands of separate retail stores. Once we move away, therefore, from considerations of a single market and a unique price we have to address the complex question of price discrimination in all its many guises. In a now classic discussion, Machlup (1955) distinguished three broad categories of price discrimination and, within those categories, a total of about 20 variations. Thus within the first category, where the individual is the basis of the discrimination, separate orders may be priced according to each person’s own negotiations or according to the intensity with which a sold or leased article is to be used. In the second category, where different groups are identified...

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