Edited by Paul Cook, Colin Kirkpatrick, Martin Minogue and David Parker
Chapter 8: Public management and regulatory governance: problems of policy transfer to developing countries
Martin Minogue INTRODUCTION: THE DEBATE ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES Analysis of regulatory governance in developing economies immediately encounters several difficulties. First, concepts of regulatory governance and the regulatory state are still relatively new in developed economies, and are generally the product of a post-privatisation phase of neoliberal economic reform. While recent surveys of privatisation on an international basis have been broadly favourable (Megginson and Netter, 2001; Shirley and Walsh, 2001) analysis of the application of privatisation and associated reforms in developing economies has been more critical, and it is clear that much more work is needed on their social effects. The picture is particularly blurred in respect of the reforms such as privatisation, contracting and regulation, which involve a new conception of state–market relations, and so add in the complexities of governance and political institutions in developing countries. Meanwhile, major players themselves appear now to be seriously divided about the appropriateness of current economic reforms and their relation to broader development strategies. There can be no gainsaying the practical hold that neoliberal policies have exerted since the 1980s through their adoption and promotion by official aid agencies and bilateral donors. This has been characterised as the ‘Washington consensus’ – a broad set of ingredients in a recipe for successful economic growth and development originally spelled out by Williamson (1990, 1996) and regarded as agreed on by crucial Washington institutions, including the IMF, the World Bank, and the US Treasury. A key perception was that ‘the role of the State was...
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