The Case of Pacific Tuna
Chapter 4: Achieving Policy Objectives through Institutional Reform
1 Once a property right holder has determined a set of policy objectives for the ﬁshery, a set of institutional structures can be determined, or reformed, to reach these policy goals. As outlined in Chapter 1, institutional structures for natural resource management relate to the nature of the property right hierarchy, entitlement systems and mechanisms for allocating and adjusting entitlement systems. From a new institutional economics perspective, determining the optimal set of institutional structures requires the comparison of transaction costs for each option. Transaction cost structures will differ for each application, depending on the characteristics of the ﬁshery, the ﬁshers and the broader institutions of social and economic governance. This chapter presents an analysis of institutional structures for an international ﬁshery, using the Western and Central Pacific tuna fishery as an example. The chapter starts in Section 4.1 with an analysis of current property right structures for an international ﬁshery with special reference to the Western and Central Pacific region. The current entitlement institutions, and institutions for 55 56 Institutional economics and ﬁsheries management allocating and adjusting entitlements, are reviewed in Section 4.2. Hindrances to institutional reform are presented in Section 4.3. A model for analysing rent generation in a multilateral ﬁshery is outlined in Section 4.4, arguing that cooperation between states is essential for sustainable and efficient governance. A proposed cooperative structure for the Western and Central Paciﬁc tuna ﬁshery is presented in Section 4.5. The chapter ends with some concluding comments. 4.1 Property rights – multilateral governance of...
You are not authenticated to view the full text of this chapter or article.