Handbook on the Economics of Happiness
Show Less

Handbook on the Economics of Happiness

Edited by Luigino Bruni and Pier Luigi Porta

This book is a welcome consolidation and extension of the recent expanding debates on happiness and economics. Happiness and economics, as a new field for research, is now of pivotal interest particularly to welfare economists and psychologists. This Handbook provides an unprecedented forum for discussion of the economic issues relating to happiness. It reviews the more recent literature and offers the interested reader an insight into the vast scope of the field in terms of the theory, its applications and also experimental design. The Handbook also gives substantial indications as to the future direction of research in the field, with particular regard to policy applications and developing an economics of interpersonal relations which includes reciprocity and social interaction theory.
Buy Book in Print
Show Summary Details
You do not have access to this content

Chapter 6: Kant on Civilization, Moralization and the Paradox of Happiness

Sergio Cremaschi


Sergio Cremaschi 1. Kant on happiness Immanuel Kant is often thought to hold that happiness is not valuable, and even to have ignored it wholly in his ethics. This is a serious mistake. It is true that for Kant moral worth is the supreme good, but by itself it is not the perfect or complete good. To be virtuous, for Kant, is to be worthy of happiness, and the perfect good requires that happiness be distributed in accordance with virtue . . . Happiness, or the sum of satisfaction of desires, is a conditional good. It is good only if it results from the satisfaction of morally permissible desires. But it is intrinsically valuable nonetheless: It is valued by a rational agent for itself, and not instrumentally.1 This assessment by a recent influential interpreter turns two centuries of misunderstanding upside down; in fact Kant was not the proponent of a ‘grumpy’ morality, which he thought indeed to be mistaken,2 but only meant to avoid its opposite, an ‘enticing’ morality that would try to encourage virtuous conduct through promises of happiness as a reward to virtue, which he believed to be a corruption of genuine morality. Kant’s polemics against eudemonism is well known, but also overstressed. In fact, he wanted to avoid doctrines corrupting the true principles of morality, or the simple reasons for acting that the conscience, or heart, of any plain man is able to perceive easily enough. But a desire to be happy was for him natural, and strong...

You are not authenticated to view the full text of this chapter or article.

Elgaronline requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books or journals. Please login through your library system or with your personal username and password on the homepage.

Non-subscribers can freely search the site, view abstracts/ extracts and download selected front matter and introductory chapters for personal use.

Your library may not have purchased all subject areas. If you are authenticated and think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

Further information

or login to access all content.