Criminalization of Competition Law Enforcement Economic and Legal Implications for the EU Member States
Economic and Legal Implications for the EU Member States
Edited by Katalin J. Cseres, Maarten Pieter Schinkel and Floris O.W. Vogelaar
Chapter 5: How Strong is the Case for Criminal Sanctions in Cartel Cases?
5. How strong is the case for criminal sanctions in cartel cases? Andreas P. Reindl1 1 INTRODUCTION This contribution provides comments on Bill Kovacic’s and Wouter Wils’ chapters. The comments will build primarily on the work of the OECD in relation to the role of sanctions in effective cartel enforcement, which in turn reﬂects the experiences of OECD member countries and observers to the OECD Competition Committee. The OECD’s work on cartels and effective anti-cartel enforcement provides support for criminal anti-cartel enforcement, including criminal sanctions against individuals. OECD publications such as the Second Cartel Report,2 have documented that ﬁnancial ﬁnes imposed on corporate cartel participants are virtually always too low to effectively deter cartels. These ﬁndings have led to the conclusion that criminal sanctions for individuals, including jail time, can be a useful complement to corporate sanctions. The Second Cartel Report therefore recommended that member countries consider introducing criminal sanctions against individuals to more effectively deter cartel activity.3 A careful study of the OECD’s work reminds us, however, that the case for a wider use of criminal sanctions4 is less straightforward than some, including Wouter Wils in his chapter, have suggested. A criminal sanctions regime not only has potential beneﬁts, but also comes with certain costs. A range of country-speciﬁc circumstances would determine what the net effective of a criminal sanctions regime would be, and we might overestimate the potential beneﬁts and/or underestimate the potential costs associated with wider use of criminal sanctions in the...
You are not authenticated to view the full text of this chapter or article.
Elgaronline requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books or journals. Please login through your library system or with your personal username and password on the homepage.
Non-subscribers can freely search the site, view abstracts/ extracts and download selected front matter and introductory chapters for personal use.
Your library may not have purchased all subject areas. If you are authenticated and think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.