A Multi-Disciplinary Perspective
Edited by Erik Verhoef, Michiel Bliemer, Linda Steg and Bert van Wee
Chapter 8: Different Policy Objectives of the Road-Pricing Problem: A Game-theoretic Approach
8. Diﬀerent policy objectives of the road-pricing problem: a gametheoretic approach Dusica Joksimovic, Michiel Bliemer, Piet Bovy 8.1 INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND This chapter considers road pricing from its microscopic foundations, meaning that interactions among individual actors are taken into account and analysed. The motivation for using such a concept was to obtain a better understanding of the pricing phenomenon among policy makers by explaining that the macroscopic results of pricing should be understood from their micro foundations (that is, the behaviour of the individual actors), in line with the more general arguments of Schelling (1978). Ideas from microeconomic theory have been applied to congestion problems in the work of Walters (1961) and Mohring (1970). More recently, Arnott et al. (2005) basically argue in favour of a microscopic approach in many diﬀerent respects, including modelling road pricing and traﬃc congestion. This part of our research adopts this approach, which aims to build the simplest possible road-pricing model that reﬂects individual behaviour of the actors in road pricing (the road authority, on the one side, and travellers, on the other). The road-pricing problem is a complex and controversial issue (Verhoef et al. 1999) including diﬀerent actors who inﬂuence one another in diﬀerent ways. In order to gain more insight into the nature of the optimal toll design problem, we shall approach the road-pricing problem by considering the simplest case of pricing and network description. On the one hand, the road authority, as one of the...
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