Money, Financial Intermediation and Governance
Show Less

Money, Financial Intermediation and Governance

Dino Falaschetti and Michael J. Orlando

Dino Falaschetti and Michael Orlando unify the treatment of the many deeply related topics in money and banking in this wide-ranging book. By continually building on the assumption that economic actors are maximizers, they explain how monetary and financial services, as well as related governance mechanisms, influence economic performance. In this manner, Money, Financial Intermediation and Governance not only lets readers make sense of today’s monetary authorities and financial markets, it lets them see through superficial complexities to the fundamental influences that will shape those organizations for years to come.
Buy Book in Print
Show Summary Details
You do not have access to this content

Chapter 8: Should Monetary Policy be Active?

Dino Falaschetti and Michael J. Orlando


THE LUCAS CRITIQUE AND POLICY EVALUATION Robert Lucas famously extended the rational expectations hypothesis to consider whether historical data can inform considerations about proposed policies. His conclusion is damning – that is, if individuals form expectations rationally, then reduced form models ‘provide no useful information as to the actual consequences of alternative economic policies’ (Lucas, 1976: 20, emphasis in original).1 Lucas’s ‘critique’ builds on Muth’s (1961) seminal insight that expectations depend on the structure in which they develop. This structure shapes how today’s economic conditions evolve into tomorrow’s. Hence, if policies change an economy’s structure, then the manner in which maximizers react to policy variables can also change. In this case, policy makers must predict individuals’ reactions under the new regime from data on the old regime – that is, information about how individuals reacted to policy variables before the economy’s structure changed! Insights to the Phillips Curve’s Breakdown To better understand Lucas’s critique, let’s consider how it rationalizes the Phillips Curve’s breakdown. Recall that the Phillips Curve, on its face, evidences the potential for policy makers to trade higher inflation for lower unemployment – that is, it suggests that monetary authorities can dampen real fluctuations if they are willing to incur nominal fluctuations. But evidence from which this trade-off became apparent takes a reduced form – that is, it largely rests on the negative correlation between price and unemployment levels during the 1960s. Given that correlation does not imply causation (see Part I), we begin to appreciate Friedman’s, Phelps’s, and others’...

You are not authenticated to view the full text of this chapter or article.

Elgaronline requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books or journals. Please login through your library system or with your personal username and password on the homepage.

Non-subscribers can freely search the site, view abstracts/ extracts and download selected front matter and introductory chapters for personal use.

Your library may not have purchased all subject areas. If you are authenticated and think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

Further information

or login to access all content.