Rewriting the Rules in Asia
Edited by M. Ramesh and Michael Howlett
Michael Howlett and M. Ramesh The evolution of regulation as a key policy instrument in the toolbox of modern government is a well known story. From the development of the principle of delegated legislation in the early years of the evolution of the modern state (Gilardi 2002; Page 2001; Thatcher and Stone Sweet 2003) to the first creation of specialized quasi-judicial independent regulatory commissions in the United States after the civil war (Huntington 1952; Eisner 1994a and 1994b), the gradual development of bureaucratic expertise and capacity in the social and economic realms has been oft-told and is a defining characteristic of the predominant policy style found in modern governments (Howlett and Ramesh 2002; Howlett 2004). Debate about the merits of this development continues in many areas, for example, whether or not regulations are in the public or private interest (Stigler 1975; Posner 1974) and whether or not they contribute to economic efficiency by correcting market failures or instead create new government failures (Le Grand 1991; Wolf 1979, 1987; Zerbe and McCurdy 1999). The discussion has generated a plethora of studies about the merits of particular types of regulation over others (Ringquist et al. 2003; Williams 2000), and the difficulties of legislative and judicial oversight of regulatory activities (McCubbins and Lupia 1994; McCubbins and Schwartz 1984; Angus 1974; de Smith 1973), among many other topics. Much less known is the reversal of regulations – deregulation – and even less about its twin: reregulation. Studies are very limited with respect to clarifying the general...
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