Edited by André de Palma, Robin Lindsey, Emile Quinet and Roger Vickerman
Chapter 28: Competition, Regulation and Public Service Obligations
Marco Ponti INTRODUCTION: THE CONCEPTUAL BACKGROUND The traditional ‘social choice’ approach states that public intervention is needed in the presence of social goals and/or of market failures. Historically this intervention has assumed the form known as ‘command and control’, that is, direct public production or, more frequently, by means of ‘public agencies’. Within this model, the public actor (the ‘principal’) is assumed in fact to be both benevolent and all-knowing. Therefore he will be perfectly able both to obtain from his ‘agents’ (the above-mentioned public agencies in charge of providing the service) efficient results, and to succeed in targeting welfare maximization. But the assumption of benevolent and all-knowing public principals and agencies is clearly unrealistic, and considering these public principals as ‘humans’, and not angels, in the line of the ‘public choice’ school, is much more realistic.1 Among the many facts that prove this orientation, are the performances of the public agencies which have in general deteriorated over time, due to mechanisms of ‘capture’, that is, the influence of the interests of the agency on the decision maker, of ‘rent seeking’, that is, the tendency of the agency to reduce its effort, and of ‘informative rents’, that is, the possibility of the agency to manipulate the relevant information in its favour (see Buchanan, 1969). The State has difficulties in simultaneously meeting welfare and efficiency objectives. It faces problems in getting productive efficiency: the minimization of labor costs is an all-important factor of efficiency, while welfare objectives are in general connected...
You are not authenticated to view the full text of this chapter or article.