Salient Institutional Issues
- New Horizons in Environmental Economics series
Edited by Albert Breton, Giorgio Brosio, Silvana Dalmazzone and Giovanna Garrone
Chapter 8: Environmental Federalism with Regards to Accidental Pollution
8. Environmental federalism with regards to accidental pollution Klaas T. van ’t Veld and Jason F. Shogren 1 INTRODUCTION The social goal of environmental protection is to reduce risks to humans and the environment. Governments and private citizens invest scarce resources to reduce risks to life and limb for people and to reduce risk to ecosystem services and biological diversity. Doing so creates opportunity costs, since public and private resources have many competing uses, for health care, education and so on. Because of these costs, a society must confront the reality that a zero-risk society is a noble yet unattainable goal. Rather, putting in place effective environmental regulation requires weighing the pros and cons of alternative institutional frameworks designed at different levels of government, all aiming to cost-effectively reduce risk. This is the purview of environmental federalism – to discover the appropriate balance between federal and local control. In the United States, for example, the institutional framework for riskreduction regulations is provided by a federalist system and a representative democracy. The task of controlling environmental risk is divided between the federal and state levels of government, whereby the federal government can assign or remove duties and responsibilities from the subordinate state governments. Beginning in the 1970s, US policy towards environmental risk became more centralized, for three reasons. First, federal regulation would, it was thought, prevent an environmental risk ‘race to the bottom’, as states lowered emission standards to attract new businesses. Second, it would account for interstate externalities that individual states...
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