Law and Economics for Civil Law Systems
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Law and Economics for Civil Law Systems

Ejan Mackaay

Ejan Mackaay offers a comprehensive look at the essential points of economic reasoning, the Coase Theorem, and legal institutions such as intellectual property, extra-contractual civil liability and contracts. The book’s structure mirrors the way law is taught in civil law countries, with structured presentations, references to civil code articles paired with non-technical explanations, and limited reliance on graphs. This English-language version builds on the success of the author’s 2008 French-language textbook on law and economics from a civil law perspective.
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Conclusion

Ejan Mackaay

Extract

In the preceding pages we have tried to show, visiting a number of core areas of civil law systems, that the economic analysis of law offers interesting insights to civil lawyers as much as it does to common lawyers. It offers tools to trace the effects of particular rules and facilitates the lawyer’s judgement on whether these rules ‘make sense’ in the light of these effects. Such reasoning allows one to consider whether rules different from the ones we have would make sense, to ‘think the unthinkable’. In this, law and economics joins hands with comparative law. This calculus can be used in reverse: to understand why historically particular rules made sense to those who adopted them. Here law and economics joins hands with legal history in trying to understand why our ancestors, acting rationally, made the rules they did. Using such reasoning on current law, one can group together rules whose apparent mission is to correct similar problems, such as dealing with forms of opportunism, and consider to what extent they are substitutes or expressions of a common underlying more general concept. It can do this within a national system, but also in a comparative exercise with concepts used in other systems. Law and economics provides here a functional language that is useful in comparing laws.

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