A Comparative Economic Analysis of US and EU Law
Chapter 4: Predatory System Innovations
SEVERAL BEHAVIORS FOR ONE CONCERN: ALLOWING MULTI-PRODUCT MONOPOLISTS TO CREATE INCOMPATIBILITY VIA INNOVATION As Chapter 3 has shown by looking at some mono-product monopolists’ behaviors, even the mere ownership of an IPR can generate some concerns, at least from the economic standpoint. This chapter completes the picture by discussing the effects that the procurement of an IPR can produce when the monopolist in question is a multi-product firm1 and,2 hence, when its practices involving IPRs affect not only the monopolized market but secondary markets as well.3 In particular, from the phenomenological 1 The book uses the distinction between mono-product and multi-product firms for simplicity’s sake though it is not always very simple to strike. Indeed, just the discussion about innovations that put together products that were previously sold separately and the so-called ‘separate product requirement’ (see footnotes 68 and 80 and the accompanying text) shows how it is complex differentiating markets across time. 2 Once again, as clarified in Chapter 3, it must be acknowledged that some of the anticompetitive strategies here described do not pivot around the mere procurement/ownership of IPRs, but around dominant firms’ ability to capture the advantages that flow from their innovations. Therefore, what is explained here could be applied, ceteris paribus, to other appropriability tools. 3 Usually the term ‘primary market’ addresses the market where the monopolist has its dominant position – i.e., the monopolized market – while the term ‘secondary market’ serves to indicate other markets where the monopolist acts. It should not come as...
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