Edited by Roger Zäch, Andreas Heinemann and Andreas Kellerhals
Chapter 1: EC Competition Law: The Dominance of Economic Analysis?
Giorgio Monti* INTRODUCTION 1 Nobody can doubt that the most noticeable trend in EC competition law since 1990 has been the increased use of economics by the EC Commission. This is manifested at a range of levels: personnel in Directorate General for Competition (DG Competition) (e.g. creation of the post of Chief Economist, an increase in economists working in the DG); decisions with increased economic sophistication;1 legal instruments designed by reference to economic studies; and general policy ambitions (e.g. the liberalisation drive that began in the early 1990s affecting utilities and other sectors shielded by state legislation; the plan to reform Article 82 EC; prosecutorial focus on hard-core cartels and away from less significant vertical restraints). Even the Commission’s sternest critic for many years, Valentine Korah, has acknowledged that there has been an improvement in this respect if one compares the concluding chapter in the Fifth and Ninth editions of her well known ‘yellow book’.2 In the earlier edition she criticised the paucity of economic analysis, while in the latest edition she notes a dramatic improvement over the last decade, although identifying discrete areas of concern. Thus, this chapter shall not call into question the fact that there is more economic analysis in EC competition law today than there was in the past, nor provide a detailed account of how economic analysis is applied in all aspects of competition enforcement.3 Instead we examine the Reader in Law, Law Department, London School of Economics, UK. E.g. COMP/34.579 Europay (Eurocard-MasterCard) 9...
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