Edited by Michael Dietrich and Jackie Krafft
Chapter 21: Cognitive Theory of the Firm: A Pragmatic Perspective
21 Cognitive theory of the firm: a pragmatist perspective Bart Nooteboom 21.1 INTRODUCTION Why a cognitive turn in theory of the firm? We talk of the knowledge economy, organizational learning, knowledge management and the like, and we should then know what we are talking about, and rather than reinventing wheels let us employ insights from cognitive science that are available. This chapter will adopt what is known as an ‘embodied cognition’ view, which has roots in philosophical pragmatism. This yields a constructivist, interactionist view of cognition. Cognition is internalized action. Goals, ideas, dispositions are largely unconscious and when they are exercised in action they run into obstacles and novel opportunities that cause them to shift. This view goes against rationalist assumptions of autonomous, pre-established goals for which optimal use of means is sought. This has important implications for theory of the firm and of inter-firm relationships. 21.2 EMBODIED COGNITION When we turn to cognitive science the problem is that there are different schools of thought. I opt for the ‘embodied cognition’ school, in the work of Damasio (1995, 2003), Lakoff and Johnson (1999) and Hendriks-Jansen (1996). It rejects Cartesian separation of body and mind and recognizes that cognition is rooted in largely unconscious bodily processes of perception, feelings and emotions. In this, Damasio (2003) goes back to the insights of Spinoza (in the second part of his Ethics). The embodied view is also found in the work of Merleau-Ponty (1964). In this embodied view, cognition is a wide concept, including...
You are not authenticated to view the full text of this chapter or article.