Edited by Fergus Lyon, Guido Möllering and Mark N.K. Saunders
Roy J. Lewicki and Chad Brinsfield INTRODUCTION In this chapter we discuss issues associated with operationalizing trust as a psychological state comprising one’s willingness to accept vulnerability and the measurement of resultant trusting behaviours. We also discuss implications arising from conceptualizing trust and distrust as distinct constructs, as well as measurement challenges associated with trust development, decline and repair over time. Trust has been conceptualized, defined, modelled, and operationalized in a wide variety of ways, and over a longer period of time than most contemporary trust researchers are aware of. Even decades ago, Stack (1978) and Wrightsman (1991) provided comprehensive reviews of thenexisting trust measures in use in the field of social psychology. Trust has been viewed as an individual disposition (Rotter, 1967, 1971; Worchel, 1979), a psychological state (Lewicki et al., 1998; Rousseau et al., 1998), or a behaviour (Deutsch, 1962; Mayer et al., 1995). Different disciplines have emphasized different components; psychologists have emphasized the importance of individual differences, intentions and expectations over behaviours, while economists have minimized the psychological aspects over the behavioural ‘evidence’. Some approaches to trust have described it as only from the perspective of the trustor (Rotter, 1967; Stack, 1978), while others have argued that a full understanding of trust must incorporate the qualities and behaviours of the trustee, or the person being trusted (for example, Mayer et al., 1995). Others have argued that trust is not a single, unidimensional construct; some have argued that trust and distrust are independent constructs (Lewicki et al., 1998)...
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