Edited by Jean-Philippe Touffut
Chapter 6: Corporate Social Responsibility as a Contractarian Model of Multi-stakeholder Corporate Governance: Normative Principles and Equilibrium Properties
6. Corporate social responsibility as a contractarian model of multistakeholder corporate governance: normative principles and equilibrium properties Lorenzo Sacconi1 INTRODUCTION The aim of this chapter is to develop a fully-fledged theory of corporate social responsibility (CSR) that is both normatively convincing and which provides an implementable model of multi-stakeholder corporate governance. My use of ‘normative’ here lies in the same vein as welfare economics and economic ethics: it is concerned with proposals of desirable reforms of economic institutions that improve social well-being and consistency with social justice and fairness according to an ethical assessment based on the idea of impartial, ex ante unanimous agreement, in other words, the ‘social contract’.2 Questions about the implementation of a given normative model, such as what kind of rules should provide for it, what incentives and individual motivations should support it, whether or not legal enforcement should be required, and whether it may rely on selfenforceability are important as well. I shall define the normative model in the first part of the chapter and develop a theory of implementation in the second. In the last three sections, I shall outline a multiple strategy for solving the problem of endogeneity and self-sustainability of a CSR norm or social standard understood according to the normative model. From the normative perspective, a CSR theory should answer the following questions. Is the proposed normative model uniquely defined? Does it provide a clear-cut normative meaning? How can it solve possible clashes among legitimate claims and interests that risk making...
You are not authenticated to view the full text of this chapter or article.
Elgaronline requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books or journals. Please login through your library system or with your personal username and password on the homepage.
Non-subscribers can freely search the site, view abstracts/ extracts and download selected front matter and introductory chapters for personal use.
Your library may not have purchased all subject areas. If you are authenticated and think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.