Competition Policy and the Economic Approach
Show Less

Competition Policy and the Economic Approach

Foundations and Limitations

Edited by Josef Drexl, Wolfgang Kerber and Rupprecht Podszun

This outstanding collection of original essays brings together some of the leading experts in competition economics, policy and law. They examine what lies at the core of the ‘economic approach to competition law’ and deal with its normative and institutional limitations. In recent years the ‘more economic approach’ has led to a modernisation of competition law throughout the world. This book comprehensively examines for the first time, the foundations and limitations of the approach and will be of great interest to scholars of competition policy no matter what discipline.
Buy Book in Print
Show Summary Details
You do not have access to this content

Chapter 4: Current Issues in Antitrust Analysis

Daniel L. Rubinfeld


Daniel L. Rubinfeld INTRODUCTION The use of empirical methods to study competitive issues, especially those relating to mergers, has been continually expanding in recent years. That growth has not come without controversy, however. In this chapter, I comment on three such issues. The first relates to market definition, the second to the relevance of market power measures in unilateral effects merger analysis, and the third to the use of merger simulation methods, again in the context of unilateral effects analysis. Market definition has historically been seen as a necessary, indeed often crucial, first step in the analysis of mergers as well as non-merger behaviour. I will point out, however, that there are circumstances in which it is preferable to skip the definition of markets and move directly to the analysis of competitive effects. With respect to market power, there has been a view that HHIs and other measures of market concentration are not especially relevant in unilateral effects analyses.1 I will suggest the contrary – that HHIs can be instructive, even in the unilateral effects context. Finally, there has been substantial debate about the use and misuse of merger simulation methods. I will explain why I consider merger simulation methods to be of continuing value, and I will discuss the current debate as to which simulation approach is most useful. 2. MARKET DEFINITION The exercise of market power requires that the firm or firms involved (collectively) face a relatively inelastic demand curve for a product at ‘competitive’ prices. Only then can...

You are not authenticated to view the full text of this chapter or article.

Elgaronline requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books or journals. Please login through your library system or with your personal username and password on the homepage.

Non-subscribers can freely search the site, view abstracts/ extracts and download selected front matter and introductory chapters for personal use.

Your library may not have purchased all subject areas. If you are authenticated and think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

Further information

or login to access all content.