The Law and Economics of Corporate Governance
Show Less

The Law and Economics of Corporate Governance

Changing Perspectives

Edited by Alessio M. Pacces

In this timely book, the law and economics of corporate governance is approached from various angles. Alessio Pacces shows that perspectives are evolving and that they differ between the economic and the legal standpoint, as well as varying between countries. A group of leading scholars offers their views and provides fresh empirical evidence on existing theories as well as developing new theoretical insights based on empirical puzzles. They all analyse the economics of corporate governance with a view to how it should, or should not, be regulated.
Buy Book in Print
Show Summary Details
You do not have access to this content

Comment on John Armour, ‘Enforcement Strategies in UK Corporate Governance: A Roadmap and Empirical Assessment’

Roberto Pardolesi


Roberto Pardolesi The first thing to say is that John Armour is simply too smart, and his chapter too sophisticated for my almost naïve command of the issues canvassed in his pages. Given this huge handicap, I am forced to a candid admission: the best that I can do is to stockpile a few, scattered remarks and submit a couple of disingenuous questions. Second, summing up very briefly the core of John Armour’s argument. Much in the vein of John Coffee, he denounces the inanity of an approach focused entirely on the black letters of the law in the books, and stresses the crucial role of the enforcement strategies, the law in action. This is why he proposes an original taxonomy, based on a double-entry matrix for enforcement: public/private, on the one hand, and formal/informal, on the other. Relying on such a framework, he undertakes the ambitious project of evaluating the contribution of each of the cells of the matrix in the realm of the UK listed companies. With the mastery of an economic scholar, John Armour, himself a lawyer, collects crude figures about private formal enforcement, a category including minority shareholder suits (the mythical derivative actions), securities litigation concerning misleading statements or omissions in disclosure, and insolvency litigation. His conclusion concerning the effectiveness of this kind of disparate pressure is merciless: it appears close to nil. With the sole exception of the US, this conclusion would obtain – I believe – for most jurisdictions I am aware of. Having thus...

You are not authenticated to view the full text of this chapter or article.

Elgaronline requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books or journals. Please login through your library system or with your personal username and password on the homepage.

Non-subscribers can freely search the site, view abstracts/ extracts and download selected front matter and introductory chapters for personal use.

Your library may not have purchased all subject areas. If you are authenticated and think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

Further information

or login to access all content.