Edited by William F. Shughart II, Laura Razzolini and Michael Reksulak
It has traditionally been thought that judges, prosecutors and lawyers operated outside the normal domain of interest-group politics. However, more recently, a literature has developed that applies public choice or interest-group reasoning to study the behavior of the various actors within the legal system. In particular, attorneys and judges are both motivated by the same kinds of economic self-interests that have been brought to bear fruitfully in modeling human action more generally. In this chapter we review some of the literature lying at the intersection of public choice and the law.
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