Research Handbook on Executive Pay
Show Less

Research Handbook on Executive Pay

Edited by Randall S. Thomas and Jennifer G. Hill

Research on executive compensation has exploded in recent years, and this volume of specially commissioned essays brings the reader up-to-date on all of the latest developments in the field. Leading corporate governance scholars from a range of countries set out their views on four main areas of executive compensation: the history and theory of executive compensation, the structure of executive pay, corporate governance and executive compensation, and international perspectives on executive pay.
Buy Book in Print
Show Summary Details
You do not have access to this content

Chapter 22: The EU and Executive Pay: Managing Harmonization Risks

Niamh Moloney


Niamh Moloney 1 INTRODUCTION: THE EU CONTEXT The purpose of this chapter is to place the executive pay debate, and particularly the debate as to whether legal intervention is warranted, in the context of the European Union (EU). Why take a regional approach to executive pay? It might be argued that jurisdictional scope might be better framed in terms of either the domestic or international contexts given the strong local path-dependencies which can influence rule design and the impact of the global competition for executive talent. Nonetheless, for a number of reasons, the EU’s regional experience with executive pay is useful. Given the corporate ownership rift which runs across the EU, the EU provides a useful laboratory for examining how executive pay and executive pay regulation behave in dispersed ownership and in block-holding ownership conditions, and in relation to different agency problems and different managerial incentives. The EU’s experience with the harmonization of executive pay rules is relevant to the debate on the dynamics of harmonization and regulatory competition internationally, given current moves, albeit in the financial stability context, to develop an international approach to pay in systemically important financial institutions (Financial Stability Board 2009 a and b and 2010 a and b). The EU’s recent reforms to executive pay (European Commission 2009a and 2009b; European Parliament and Council 2010) usefully illustrate the risks which follow legislative intervention. In particular, they highlight the dangers which arise where legislators deviate from a shareholder incentive alignment model as the basis for intervention,...

You are not authenticated to view the full text of this chapter or article.

Elgaronline requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books or journals. Please login through your library system or with your personal username and password on the homepage.

Non-subscribers can freely search the site, view abstracts/ extracts and download selected front matter and introductory chapters for personal use.

Your library may not have purchased all subject areas. If you are authenticated and think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

Further information

or login to access all content.