Edited by Adam Graycar and Russell G. Smith
Chapter 20: Activist Regulatory Practices in Corruption Prevention: A Case Study from Montenegro
Bryane Michael INTRODUCTION Anti-corruption agencies are mushrooming across Central Europe and the Former Soviet Union. In 2009, over 40 per cent of the countries in the region had some form of anti-corruption agency. As shown by de Sousa (2006), many of these agencies are preventive – rather than repressive. Namely, they serve to co-ordinate policy (often serving as the international contact point for international co-operation), help educate the public about the harms of corruption and conduct research on corruption-related issues. The legislation devolving these competencies to such agencies often consists of highly abstract language, riddled with ambiguities, and often provides the same competencies to other agencies (such as preventive departments in repressive agencies in police, customs and sometimes even a special office in the prosecutor’s office charged with finding and chasing large bribe takers and receivers). The design of preventive anti-corruption agencies is of interest to legal scholars for three reasons. First, the anti-corruption law – and particularly questions related to the organizations needed to enforce such law – represents a burgeoning field of public law and international law. As argued below, the UN Convention Against Corruption imposes obligations on signatory states, which make the issue of preventive anticorruption policy necessary and timely. Second, the question brings legal scholars into the realm of organizational theory – hitherto the preserve of management scholars, economists and scholars of public administration. Legislation which sets out the organizational design and function of an anti-corruption agency touches on all the classic issues tackled by both classical and post-modern organizational...
You are not authenticated to view the full text of this chapter or article.