Handbook of Environmental and Resource Economics
Show Less

Handbook of Environmental and Resource Economics

Edited by Jeroen C.J.M. van den Bergh

This major reference book comprises specially commissioned surveys in environmental and resource economics written by an international team of experts. Authoritative yet accessible, each entry provides a state-of-the-art summary of key areas that will be invaluable to researchers, practitioners and advanced students.
Buy Book in Print
Show Summary Details
You do not have access to this content

Chapter 16: Imperfect Markets, Technological Innovation and Environmental Policy Instruments

C. Carraro


16 Imperfect markets, technological innovation and environmental policy instruments Carlo Carrarol 1. Background During the last few decades, most environmental policy analyses have focused on the development of policy instruments suitable for the regulation of perfectly competitive or monopolistic markets. However, the structure of the traditional instruments cannot be deemed appropriate when the market targeted for regulation does not possess the polar characteristics of perfect competition or monopoly. Under oligopoly, which is probably a more realistic analytical framework to describe modern industrial markets, other externalities, in addition to the environmental ones, have to be accounted for, and this drastically affects the characteristics and the effectiveness of regulatory instruments. Emission taxes (or effluent fees), along with emission controls and tradable permits, have emerged among the most important instruments for correcting environmental externalities. Emission taxes internalize the external damages associated with polluting activities. The internalization is complete when the fees equal the marginal external damages of pollution, such as in the case of Pigouvian taxes. It has been shown, however, that the socially optimal degree of internalization depends on the market structure. Under perfect competition, the desired internalization is complete, while under imperfectly competitive conditions, optimal taxes deviate from external damages, as was first noted by Buchanan (1969) for the case of monopoly. Complete internalization of external damages created by a monopolist will impose additional social costs by restricting the suboptimal (too low) output of the monopolist more than required for attaining social optimality. In this case, the optimal effluent fee will...

You are not authenticated to view the full text of this chapter or article.

Elgaronline requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books or journals. Please login through your library system or with your personal username and password on the homepage.

Non-subscribers can freely search the site, view abstracts/ extracts and download selected front matter and introductory chapters for personal use.

Your library may not have purchased all subject areas. If you are authenticated and think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

Further information

or login to access all content.