Game Theory and International Environmental Cooperation
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Game Theory and International Environmental Cooperation

  • Elgar Research Reviews in Economics

Michael Finus and Alejandro Caparrós

Key environmental issues, such as biodiversity and climate change, have in recent years become more pressing than ever. Where the critical papers in the early 1990s explained the difficulties of cooperation in tackling transboundary environmental problems, later works have analyzed the various alternatives, and increased our understanding of various institutional designs and negotiation protocols' impact on the success of cooperation. This research review identifies the most important articles on the game theoretic analysis of international environmental cooperation to both confront the cooperative and non-cooperative approaches to this, and demonstrate the diversity of methods used to analyze international environmental agreements.
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Review Article

Michael Finus and Alejandro Caparrós

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