Edited by Christopher Ansell and Jacob Torfing
Chapter 27: Public choice theory
The chapter covers the history and general outline of public choice theory, the most crucial aspect of which is the focus on incentive structures, and how these affect behavior and governance. The chapter critically discusses key public choice insights on collective action, centralization versus decentralization, public control over the bureaucracy, the effects of competition and the ideas behind and outcomes of New Public Management theory. It ends with a discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of public choice theory, and some directions for future research.
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