Jump to Content
Jump to Main Navigation
Get Access or Sign In
Register
Browse
Librarian Services
Contact our Sales Department
Customer Service
Benefits
Authentication and Remote Access
Licensing Terms & Conditions
MARC Records
KBART Lists
Indexing & Discoverability
Free Trial
Customer Resource
Help
Academic Libraries
Non-Academic Libraries
Researchers & Students
Products
Major Annual Subject Collections
Essentials Collections
Handbook Collections
Encyclopedia
Subject Specific Collections
Tailored/Pick & Choose Collections
Elgar Advanced Introductions: Law
Practitioner Law Collections
Open Access
Subjects
Business & Management
Economics & Finance
Environment
Geography, Planning & Tourism
Law
Political Science & Public Policy
Sociology, Social Policy & Education
Journals
Journals
Pricing & Subscriptions
Journal Policies
Open Access Journals
Search
Advanced Search
Help
Advanced Search
Help
Get Access or Sign In
Register
Browse
Librarian Services
Contact our Sales Department
Customer Service
Benefits
Authentication and Remote Access
Licensing Terms & Conditions
MARC Records
KBART Lists
Indexing & Discoverability
Free Trial
Customer Resource
Help
Academic Libraries
Non-Academic Libraries
Researchers & Students
Products
Major Annual Subject Collections
Essentials Collections
Handbook Collections
Encyclopedia
Subject Specific Collections
Tailored/Pick & Choose Collections
Elgar Advanced Introductions: Law
Practitioner Law Collections
Open Access
Subjects
Business & Management
Economics & Finance
Environment
Geography, Planning & Tourism
Law
Political Science & Public Policy
Sociology, Social Policy & Education
Journals
Pricing & Subscriptions
Journal Policies
Open Access Journals
Previous Chapter
Next Chapter
Contents
Jac C. Heckelman
and
Nicholas R. Miller
Full access
Download PDF
Category:
Handbook Chapter
Published:
18 Dec 2015
Page Range:
v–vi
Collection:
Economics 2015
Full access
Download PDF
PDF
Handbook of Social Choice and Voting
Edited by
Jac C. Heckelman
and
Nicholas R. Miller
Handbook
Published:
18 Dec 2015
Print ISBN:
9781783470723
eISBN:
9781783470730
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.4337/9781783470730
Pages:
c 424
Collection:
Economics 2015
Buy Print
Table of Contents
Front Matter
Copyright
Contents
Contributors
Chapter 1: Introduction: issues in social choice and voting
PART I: Perspectives on Social Choice
Chapter 2: The strange history of social choice
Chapter 3: Unanimous consent and constitutional economics
Chapter 4: Rational choice and the calculus of voting
Chapter 5: Computational social choice
PART II: Pairwise Social Choice
Chapter 6: Majority rule and tournament solutions
Chapter 7: Supermajority rules
Chapter 8: The measurement of a priori voting power
Chapter 9: Condorcet jury theorems
PART III: Spatial Models of Social Choice
Chapter 10: The spatial model of social choice and voting
Chapter 11: A unified spatial model of American political institutions
Chapter 12: Competing for votes
Chapter 13: Probabilistic voting in models of electoral competition
PART IV: Social Choice from Multiple Alternatives
Chapter 14: Arrow’s Theorem and its descendants
Chapter 15: Properties and paradoxes of common voting rules
Chapter 16: Voting mysteries: a picture is worth a thousand words
Chapter 17: Multiple-winner voting rules
PART V: Empirical Social Choice
Chapter 18: Measuring ideology in Congress
Chapter 19: The uncovered set and its applications
Chapter 20: Empirical examples of voting paradoxes
Glossary of terms pertaining to social choice and voting
Index
Subjects
Economics and Finance
Political Economy
Public Choice Theory
Politics and Public Policy
Political Economy
Public Choice
Email this content
Share Link
Copy this link, or click below to email it to a friend
Email this content
or copy the link directly:
https://www.elgaronline.com/view/edcoll/9781783470723/9781783470723.00003.xml
The link was not copied. Your current browser may not support copying via this button.
Link copied successfully
Copy link
[18.205.176.39]
18.205.176.39
Sign in to annotate
Close
Edit
Character limit
500
/500
Delete
Cancel
Save
@!
Character limit
500
/500
Cancel
Save
View Expanded
View Table
View Full Size