Chapter 20: Empirical examples of voting paradoxes
Marek M. Kaminski
Category:
Handbook Chapter
Published:
18 Dec 2015
Page Range:
367–387
Collection:
Economics 2015
Restricted access

20. Empirical examples of voting paradoxes Marek M. Kaminski 20.1 INTRODUCTION Several earlier chapters, especially Chapter 15, identified important properties of voting rules whose violation is sufficiently counter-­intuitive that we may call the...

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Cover Handbook of Social Choice and Voting
Handbook of Social Choice and Voting
Edited by Jac C. Heckelman and Nicholas R. Miller
Handbook
Published:
18 Dec 2015
Print ISBN:
9781783470723
eISBN:
9781783470730
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.4337/9781783470730
Pages:
c 424
Collection:
Economics 2015
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