Edited by Klaus Detterbeck and Eve Hepburn
Chapter 3: Federal, devolved or decentralized state: on the territorial architectureof power
Multilevel government approaches allow us to discern the basic dimensions of territorial power distributions in federal, devolved and decentralized states. Arguments for establishing multilevel government structures in the history of political thought can be differentiated between a ‘cooperative surplus’ and a ‘protection from power through competition’ school. In analysing the power structures, the ideal-types of interstate versus intrastate federalism are shown to be fruitful for comparing multilevel government arrangements. The chapter discusses the effects of these ideal-type architectures on democracy, conflict resolution and political stability.
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