Edited by Gary Jacobsohn and Miguel Schor
Chapter 5: Constitutional dialogue and judicial supremacy
Abstract: This chapter examines constitutional dialogue by comparing a constitutional system that (almost) entrenches judicial supremacy—the United States—with a constitutional system that seeks to reconcile judicial with legislative supremacy—Canada. This chapter makes two arguments. First, if judicial will is checked by dialogue in constitutional systems as different as the United States and Canada, then claims that constitutional courts inevitably arrogate too much power thereby undermining democracy sweep too broadly. All polities that enjoy constitutional supremacy have formal and informal mechanisms that allow democratic actors to trump courts in some fashion. Second, there is considerable institutional variation in the mechanisms by which judicial will may be checked. Weaker courts are less likely to engender social conflict as they are more likely to facilitate negotiation and consensus over constitutional meaning.
You are not authenticated to view the full text of this chapter or article.
Elgaronline requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books or journals. Please login through your library system or with your personal username and password on the homepage.
Non-subscribers can freely search the site, view abstracts/ extracts and download selected front matter and introductory chapters for personal use.
Your library may not have purchased all subject areas. If you are authenticated and think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.